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1. Introduction 
 
Since the surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) across the world in the 1980s, FDI is 
considered as a conduit of transferring physical capital and intangible assets, such as technology, 
skills and human capital development. The greater mobility of factors of production stimulated 
by the presence of multinational corporations (MNCs) affects the income distribution within the 
host country and therefore generates interests in studying the effect of FDI on income inequality. 
Theories to explain the relationship between FDI and income inequality can be summarized as 
the modernization hypothesis and the dependency hypothesis. The modernization hypothesis 
treats foreign capital and domestic capital as homogeneous goods (Tsai, 1995). The inflow of 
foreign capital adds to gross domestic investment and fosters economic growth. The continued 
growth expands the middle class and increases employment and the savings rates among the 
poor, leading to reduction in income inequality (Adams, 2008). Therefore, the modernization 
hypothesis suggests a negative relationship between FDI and income inequality. However, the 
dependency hypothesis argues that FDI increases wages in international sectors where MNCs 
produce to a greater extent than those in traditional sectors (Girling, 1973; Rubinson, 1976; 
Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985; Choi, 2006). Accordingly, the dependency hypothesis 
predicts that FDI is associated with rising income inequality.  
 
Unlike the conflicting theoretical predictions, the existing empirical studies generally point to the 
detrimental effect of FDI on income distribution. Tsai (1995) shows that the increase in foreign 
capital gives rise to more unequal income distribution in East and Southeast Asian developing 
countries. Mah (2002) finds that FDI inflows increase the income inequality measured by the 
Gini index using Korean data. Based on 14 European country data over the period 1951-1995, 
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Lee (2006) presents that FDI raises income inequality. Choi (2006) suggests that the increase in 
FDI inflows deteriorates the income distribution using country-level data between 1993 and 
2002. Adams (2008) finds a positive relationship between FDI and income inequality using panel 
data of 62 developing countries from 1985 to 2001. Based on a panel of 100 countries from 1980 
to 2002, Figini and Görg (2011) show that FDI presents a nonlinear effect on wage inequality in 
developing countries such that wage inequality rises initially with the inflows of foreign 
investment, yet wage inequality declines as foreign investment continues to increase. 
Furthermore, Figini and Görg (2011) show that FDI reduces wage inequality in developed 
countries.   
 
This paper attempts to distinguish two modes of FDI – cross-border mergers & acquisitions 
(M&As) and greenfield FDI and examine whether the two modes of FDI have differential effects 
on income inequality. MNCs can undertake FDI between building its own establishment 
(greenfield investment) or to acquire an existing firm (cross-border M&As) (Nocke and Yeaple, 
2007). The two forms of investment are different in nature (Wang and Wong, 2009). Economic 
studies suggest that greenfield FDI and M&As may have different economic consequences in the 
host country. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTACD) in the 
World Investment Report (WIR) (2000) documents that „FDI entry through the takeover of 
domestic firms is less beneficial, if not positively harmful, for economic development than entry 
by setting up new facilities.‟ Blonigen and Slaughter (2001) find that greenfield manufacturing 
FDI does not contribute to U.S. within industry skill-upgrading. Conyon et al (2002) present 
findings that M&As contribute to an increase in labor productivity in the United Kingdom. Liu 
and Zhou (2008) find that greenfield FDI in Chinese high-technology industries is associated 
with both intra-industry and inter-industry spillovers and M&As only exhibit inter-industry 
spillovers. Wang and Wong (2009) show that greenfield FDI improves economic growth while 
M&As have negative effects on the host country‟s economic growth.   
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature by distinguishing and comparing the effects of 
different types of multinational activities on income distribution within the host country. Using a 
sample of 93 countries from 1990 to 2009, we find that greenfield investment is positively 
associated with income inequality while M&As present an insignificant effect. However, in 
contrast to the positive effect of average greenfield investment, we find that greenfield 
investment in Latin America and Caribbean region decreases income inequality. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II lays out the econometric model. 
Section III discusses the data and section IV presents the analysis of empirical results. Section V 
concludes.  
2. Econometric Model 
 
The following model is utilized to explore potentially different effects of M&As and greenfield 
FDI in host country i on domestic income inequality at time t.   
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GINIit = β0 + β1MAit + β2GREENit + β3GDP_PCAPit + β4GDP_PCAPSQit + β5GROWTHit + 
β6TRADEit + β7GOVTit + β8Hit + β9AGRILit + δi + γt + εit 
where the Gini index is used to measure the extent of income inequality within a country. MA 
and GREEN represent cross-border M&As and greenfield investment as a percentage of gross 
domestic fixed investment respectively.  
 
GDP_PCAP is real per capita GDP and GDP_PCAPSQ is the squared real per capita GDP. 
These variables are included to reflect the Kuznets hypothesis such that income inequality may 
increase in the early stages of economic development and decline once a certain threshold level 
of development is reached (Lee, 2006). Therefore, GDP_PCAP is expected to have a positive 
coefficient, while the coefficient of GDP_PCAPSQ is anticipated to be negative. GROWTH 
stands for real per capita GDP growth rates. A higher short-term growth rates tends to exacerbate 
inequality (Tsai, 1995). Yet, most studies do not provide any evidence for this detrimental effect 
of higher short-term growth (Ahluwalia, 1976; Ram, 1984; Papanek and Kyn, 1987; Tsai, 1995). 
Therefore, the sign of the coefficient of GROWTH is ambiguous. TRADE is the share of trade, 
measured as the sum of exports and imports, in a country‟s GDP. The share of trade volume in 
GDP indicates openness and affects the income distribution by altering the relative demand for 
skilled and unskilled labor (Lee, 2006). The sign of this coefficient is undetermined, depending 
on factor abundance relative to the major trading partners, suggested by the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem. If the country is relatively labor abundant, openness will promote more equal income 
distribution. However, if the country is relatively capital abundant, openness will deteriorate 
income distribution. GOVT denotes the share of government expenditures in a country‟s GDP 
and is expected to have a negative coefficient.  As a major role of government is to improve 
distribution inequality, a stronger government would favor more equal income distribution (Tsai, 
1995). H is human capital, measured as the gross secondary school enrollment. AGRIL 
represents the share of agricultural employment in total employment. As suggested by the 
development literature, an improvement in human capital would foster more equal income 
distribution; however, a higher proportion of agricultural employment is likely to decrease 
income equality. 
 
δi and γt are country and time fixed-effect variables to capture the unobserved effects across 
country and time respectively. εit is the classical random error. 
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3. Data Description 
 
Data are compiled from two sources: cross-border M&As are collected from the FDI database at 
the UNCTAD website and the other variables are obtained from the World Bank‟s World 
Development Indicators (WDI).  
 
Cross-border M&As measure sales of companies in the host country to foreign transnational 
corporations (TNCs) less sales of foreign affiliates in the host country (WIR, 2009). The data 
cover only those deals that involve an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10%. While the 
original M&As data are denominated in millions of US dollars, we transform them into the 
variable MA as a share of gross domestic fixed investment. There are no existing greenfield 
investment data available for this study. We follow the practice of UNCTAD (2000) and Wang 
and Wong (2009) by taking the difference between total FDI and M&As to create a proxy for 
greenfield FDI. Specifically, greenfield investment in this study is net FDI inflows less M&As 
and converted into a share in gross domestic fixed investment. 
 
The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, 
consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a 
perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of zero represents perfect equality, while an index of 
100 implies perfect inequality.1 Per capita GDP is measured in constant 2000 US dollars and the 
growth rate of per capita GDP is based on constant local currency.  
 
The data are transformed into five-year averages for the following periods: 1990-1994, 1995-
1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2009. 93 countries are included in the analysis. Due to missing 
observations, the data used in the estimation are an unbalanced panel. Descriptive statistics for 
the variables are listed in Table 1. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
The first column in Table 2 presents the fixed-effects estimation of the impact of aggregate 
inward FDI on the Gini coefficient based on the empirical specification described in Section II.2 
This baseline regression allows us to compare our results to those in the existing studies. In 
regression (1), total inward FDI exhibits a positive effect on the Gini coefficient. This is 
consistent with prior empirical results that FDI is associated with an increase in income 
inequality.  
 
Regression (2) separates the distributional effects of greenfield investment and M&As. The 
estimated results show that M&As have an insignificant effect on income inequality while 
greenfield investment has a positive effect on income disparities and the effect is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. When comparing the coefficient of FDI in regression (1) with 
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those of the two modes of FDI in regression (2), it implies that the detrimental effect of FDI on 
income distribution found in prior studies may be attributed to greenfield investment.  
 
Furthermore, we reconstruct the share of FDI in gross domestic fixed investment as well as the 
share of greenfield investment using the FDI inflows data from the WIR. The estimated results 
are reported in regressions (3) for the FDI share and regression (4) for the shares of M&As and 
greenfield investment. The estimated results are qualitatively similar to those of regressions (1) 
and (2).  
 
In addition, we generate dummy variables for developed countries (DC), East and Southeast 
Asian countries (ASIA), and Latin American and Caribbean countries (LA). We multiply the 
regional dummy variables with M&As and greenfield investment and include the interactive 
variables in the empirical specification attempting to capture the potential regional difference in 
income inequality. Regression (5) reports the estimated results including the interactive variables 
of DC and different modes of FDI. Greenfield investment still exhibits a positive coefficient, yet 
the coefficients of MA x DC and GREEN x DC are statistically insignificant. This result implies 
that no significant difference in the distributional impact could be found between the two modes 
of FDI in developed countries and developing countries. When including the interaction of Asia 
and LA dummy variables with M&As and greenfield investment, regression (6) shows that the 
M&As and greenfield investment have insignificant effects on income disparity measured by the 
Gini index in East and Southeast Asia. However, the coefficient of GREEN x LA is negative and 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level, though the coefficient of MA x LA is 
insignificant. The results suggest that the increase in greenfield FDI might have more favorable 
distributional impact in Latin American and Caribbean countries than in the reference group. 
Overall, the coefficient of greenfield investment in regressions (5) and (6) remains positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
There has been a concern that the inflows of FDI may affect the income distribution within the 
host country. Although the theoretical studies have not reached a consensus, most of the 
empirical results imply a deleterious effect of FDI on income equality. The production of MNCs 
in host countries involves two forms: M&As and greenfield investment. The two modes of FDI 
may exhibit different economic consequences, though most of the empirical and theoretical 
literature has not distinguished between them (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007). Therefore, the purpose 
of this paper is to investigate whether these two forms of FDI have differential effects on income 
inequality.  
 
Using a panel of 93 countries over the period of 1990-2009, this study finds that the 
distributional effect of greenfield investment on income equality is significantly negative, while 
that of M&As is insignificant. Furthermore, M&As and greenfield investment are not associated 
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with more equal income distribution in developed countries than in developing countries. In 
addition, our results show that greenfield investment contributes to a more equal income 
distribution in Latin American and Caribbean countries.  
 
Our findings suggest a policy implication to policymakers in terms of evaluating the cost of 
greenfield investment. Traditionally, host countries often favor greenfield investment as it 
creates jobs and adds to local employment. However, it is a caution to host countries‟ 
government that the production of MNCs in the form of greenfield investment is associated 
greater income disparity. Furthermore, polices are necessary to alleviate the exacerbation of 
income inequality when receiving greenfield investment.  
Endnotes 
*Corresponding author: Hong Zhuang, PhD. Assistant Professor of Economics, Judd Leighton 
School of Business and Economics, Indiana University South Bend, 1700 Mishawaka Ave. 
South Bend, IN 46634. Email: zhuangh@iusb.edu. The authors would like to thank the editor 
and the anonymous referees for helpful comments.  
1. The interpretation of the Gini index is cited from the website of World Development 
Indicators. 
2. The fixed-effects estimator is used to estimate the econometric model. To justify the inclusion 
of country fixed effects, the Breush and Pagan LM test is conducted after the random-effects 
estimation. The test rejects the null hypothesis that the country-specific fixed effects are jointly 
equal to zero at the 1 percent significant level. Furthermore, the Hausman test indicates that 
fixed-effects estimates are preferred to random-effects estimates.  
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GINI: the Gini coefficient (100) 347 41.435 9.946 0.000 74.330 
FDI: Inward FDI flows as a percentage 
of gross domestic fixed investment (%) 
334 22.246 93.312 -12.986 1680.255 
MA: M&As as a percentage of gross 
domestic fixed investment (%) 
269 4.341 6.048 -5.859 36.287 
GREEN: Greenfield investment as a 
percentage of gross domestic fixed 
investment (%) 
268 19.643 101.807 -20.016 1657.106 
GDP_PCAP: Per capita GDP (in 
constant 2000 US dollars) 
346 3618.155 6779.394 93.214 48142.260 
GROWTH: Per Capita GDP growth 
rates (%) 
347 2.061 3.720 -19.189 19.873 
TRADE: Trade as a percentage of GDP 
(%) 
341 80.304 40.353 15.564 269.405 
GOVT: Government consumption as a 
percentage of GDP (%) 
338 14.762 5.604 4.080 37.917 
H: Secondary enrollment (%) 322 64.413 30.738 5.250 145.338 
AGRIL: Agricultural employment as a 
percentage of total employment (%) 
241 27.323 20.582 0.380 88.800 
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Table 2 Empirical Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP_PCAP 0.633 -0.318 0.506 -0.441 -0.436 0.551 
 (0.00113) (0.00110) (0.00114) (0.00111) (0.00111) (0.00119) 
GDP_PCAP 
SQ 
-0.0421 
(0.0408) 
-0.00536 
(0.0394) 
-0.0378 
(0.0410) 
-0.00101 
(0.0398) 
0.000103 
(0.0400) 
-0.0380 
(0.0427) 
FDI 0.105***      
 (0.0327)      
MA  0.0759  0.0747 0.0894 0.130 
  (0.0588)  (0.0587) (0.0600) (0.0820) 
GREEN  0.105***   0.105*** 0.142*** 
  (0.0383)   (0.0389) (0.0452) 
TRADE 0.00478 0.00311 0.00361 0.00196 -0.00493 -8.36e-05 
 (0.0251) (0.0227) (0.0251) (0.0227) (0.0239) (0.0230) 
GOVT 0.302** 0.105 0.286** 0.0913 0.119 0.136 
 (0.144) (0.162) (0.143) (0.163) (0.165) (0.163) 
H 0.0672 0.00630 0.0696 0.00862 0.0136 0.0271 
 (0.0553) (0.0545) (0.0556) (0.0550) (0.0550) (0.0554) 
GROWTH -0.215** -0.188* -0.229** -0.198* -0.177* -0.199* 
 (0.0959) (0.104) (0.0959) (0.104) (0.105) (0.107) 
AGRIL 0.0139 0.0378 0.0159 0.0399 0.0403 0.0445 
 (0.0478) (0.0497) (0.0478) (0.0497) (0.0498) (0.0502) 
FDI_WIR   0.109***    
   (0.0325)    
GREEN_WIR    0.106***   
    (0.0376)   
MA x DC     -0.403  
     (0.327)  
GREEN x DC     0.0938  
     (0.189)  
MA x ASIA      -0.476 
      (0.486) 
GREEN x 
ASIA 
     -0.113 
      (0.294) 
MA x LA      -0.173 
      (0.121) 
GREEN x LA      -0.154* 
      (0.0823) 
Constant 29.62*** 36.77*** 30.99*** 38.10*** 36.11*** 33.46*** 
 (5.157) (4.998) (5.013) (4.895) (5.098) (5.210) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
Dummy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 224 202 223 201 202 202 
R-squared 0.245 0.234 0.252 0.239 0.246 0.273 
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Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
FDI_WIR: FDI inflows from the World Investment Report (WIR). GREEN_WIR: the difference 
between FDI_WIR and MA. DC: a binary dummy variable where 1 = if the country is a 
developed country and 0 = otherwise. ASIA: a binary dummy variable where 1 = if the country 
is an East and Southeast Asian country and 0 = otherwise. LA: a binary dummy variable where 1 
= if the country is a Latin American and Caribbean country and 0 = otherwise.  
 
 
 
 
